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Abstract
In this paper we diverge from the existing empirical literature on FDI determinants
in two ways. First, we decompose the sources of the foreign direct investment (FDI) gap
between Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and other developing regions. Once market size has
been accounted for, we ﬁnd that SSA's FDI deﬁcit is mostly explained by insuﬃcient
provision of public goods: low human capital accumulation, especially health, in SSA
explains 100-140% of the inter-regional FDI gaps. Second, we estimate the indirect eﬀect
of infectious diseases on FDI through their direct impact on health. We ﬁnd that a 1%
point rise in HIV prevalence in the adult population is associated with a decrease in net FDI
inﬂows of 3.5%, while a country in which 100% of the population is at risk of contracting
deadly malaria receives about 16% less FDI than a similar country located in a malaria-free
region.
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Developing countries are eager to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), in order to boost
their productivity and economic growth. However, they diverge widely in their ability to attract
FDI. Whereas the median FDI to GDP ratio over the 1984-2004 period was 1.8% in South-
East and East Asia (SEA) and 1.72% in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), FDI inﬂows
represented less than 1% of GDP in a median country in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). As other
studies have argued, this disappointing performance of SSA reﬂects its poor record in terms of
public governance. When discussing the alternative explanations for the SSA growth tragedy
(Easterly and Levine, 1997), Collier and Gunning (1999) conclude that while the binding
constraint upon Africa's growth may have been externally-oriented policies in the past, those
policies have now been softened. Today, the chief problem is those policies which are ostensibly
domestically-oriented, notably poor delivery of public services. These problems are much more
diﬃcult to correct than exchange rate and trade policies, and so the policy reform area needs
to be intensiﬁed  (p.20). Growth and FDI tend to share the same determinants; for instance,
while Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2004) demonstrate the strong impact of
public governance on growth, Globerman and Shapiro (2002, 2003) show that better-governed
countries receive more FDI. Hence, it is likely that the low FDI to GDP ratio in SSA at least
partly results from inadequate domestically-oriented and externally-oriented policies, especially
in comparison to those prevailing in other developing regions.
Although many papers have investigated the determinants of FDI in developing countries,1
the majority of them exclude SSA countries from their sample, use an early and short period
of investigation, focus only on one factor of attractiveness, omit non-traditional determinants
such as democracy or human capital level, and sometimes fail to diﬀerentiate between long-run
and short-run FDI dynamics with appropriate panel econometric techniques. Furthermore the
overly narrow view of public governance as referring mostly to the protection of property rights,
which diverges from the broad deﬁnitions of La Porta et al. (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (1999),
obscures the overwhelming role of governments in shaping the attractiveness of their country. In
this paper, we ﬁrst seek to remedy to these deﬁciencies. We provide a comprehensive literature
review that puts forward the idea that public governance provides a useful framework within
which to apprehend most traditional and new determinants of FDI in developing countries
at the macroeconomic level and in a global context. The impact of each public governance
1See Asiedu (2002) and Rogoﬀ and Reinhart (2003) for a summary of the literature.
dimension is tested using yearly panel data for 70 developing countries, including 28 SSA
countries, over the 1985-2004 period. Proxies for each public governance dimension have been
carefully chosen, distinguishing for instance between liberal and illiberal democracies. The
choice of a ﬁxed eﬀects panel model allows the investigation of short-run FDI dynamics, where
the estimates solely indicate how FDI responds to policy reforms over time, regardless of history
or geography. Our ﬁndings contribute to the recent literature on new FDI determinants by
showing that, in addition to better macroeconomic policies and higher security of property
rights and contracts, the adoption of a liberal democratic regime and improvements in the
health and education of the population increase FDI strongly. However, this kind of econometric
analysis provides little guidance about which public governance dimension should be a priority
for SSA countries seeking to close their FDI gap with other developing countries. Hence, this
paper innovates in comparison to previous FDI studies by including a second stage in which the
sources of SSA's FDI gap with other developing regions are decomposed. Such a decomposition
shows that SSA's FDI deﬁcit is mostly explained by market size and insuﬃcient public goods
provision. Depending on the benchmark developing region, about 100-140% of inter-regional
FDI gaps can be explained by low human capital accumulation in SSA, education and health,
once market size has been taken into account. Diﬀerences in the degree of democracy, quality of
macroeconomic policies and security of property rights matter much less. The elasticity of FDI
to these determinants is smaller and contrary to common wisdom, the quality of SSA governance
in these areas is not much diﬀerent to that of other developing regions. Finally, taking as a
starting point the large contribution of poor health to SSA's FDI deﬁcit, this paper explores
the indirect impact of infectious diseases on FDI, through their direct eﬀects on health. The
determinants of life expectancy include three well-known scourges of SSA: HIV/AIDS,2 malaria
and tuberculosis. We ﬁnd that a 1% point rise in HIV prevalence in the adult population is
associated with a decrease in net FDI inﬂows of 3.5%, while a country in which 100% of the
population is at risk of contracting deadly malaria receives about 16% less FDI than a similar
country located in a malaria-free region. Once HIV-related mortality eﬀects are accounted
for, tuberculosis has no additional incidence on health, and by extension, on net FDI inﬂows.
Overall, if HIV and malaria had not existed, yearly net FDI inﬂows in the median SSA country
would have been predicted to be one-third higher during the 2000-2004 period. The estimated
2HIV is the acronym for Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus and AIDS is the acronym for Acquired Immunod-
eﬁciency Syndrome.
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FDI losses induced by infectious diseases are therefore very large and can be seen as another
channel through which these diseases reduce growth in SSA.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows: section 1 examines, through a review
of the literature, the theoretical and empirical impact of public governance on foreign direct
investment. Section 2 presents the econometric model, describes the data used and discusses
the estimation technique employed. Section 3 provides the empirical results and calculates the
relative contribution of each public governance dimension to the FDI gap between SSA and
other developing regions. Section 4 estimates the indirect impact of infectious diseases on FDI
through their direct eﬀects on health. Section 5 concludes.
1 Public governance and FDI
Public governance can be deﬁned as the exercise of authority through formal and informal tra-
ditions and institutions for the common good  (Thomas et al., 2000, p.137). At the macroeco-
nomic level, four dimensions of government performance can be outlined: degree of democracy,
provision of public goods, macroeconomic policies and security of property rights and contracts.
Each one may contribute to the generation of an attractive business climate for foreign investors
for the following reasons:3
(a) Degree of democracy
A democracy can be deﬁned as a regime in which the government is vertically and horizon-
tally accountable (Merkel, 2004). Free, fair, competitive elections and a politically active civil
society allow citizens to choose, monitor and periodically replace their governants. In addition,
the existence of checks and balances constraining the discretion of political actors, especially the
executive, ensures that elected representatives possess the eﬀective power to govern and that
policies are intertemporally credible. In the absence of one of these three democratic pillars, the
democracy is defective, giving rise, for instance, to an illiberal democracy in which governants
are initially elected but are otherwise non-accountable (Zakaria, 1997; Merkel, 2004).
3Whenever possible, only econometric studies which limit themselves to a sample of developing countries are
discussed. As underlined by Wheeler and Mody (1992), Singh and Jun (1995) and Blonigen and Wang (2005),
we do not expect countries that have dissimilar structures to exhibit the same parameters.
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FDI should be attracted to democratic countries. First of all, democracy tends to reduce
political and economic uncertainty. Politically, it is assumed that regular elections and free
circulation of information within civil society serve as a disciplining device of public oﬃcials,
improve the transparency of political decisions and decrease the risk of public dissatisfaction be-
ing expressed through violent means (Rivera-Batiz, 2002). Economically, democratic countries
have been shown by Rodrik (2000) and Almeida and Ferreira (2002) to be more predictable in
the long-run, more stable in the short-run and to handle adverse shocks better. Furthermore,
democracies may be more open to FDI (Jakobsen and De Soysa, 2006). On the one hand,
workers are likely to gain from higher FDI as multinational ﬁrms tend to pay higher wages
and provide better working conditions than their local counterparts (Brown et al., 2003). On
the other hand, increased competition from foreign ﬁrms means that local ﬁrms will lose some
market share and see their proﬁts shrink. Workers, as opposed to capital-owners, represent
the bulk of the population in developing countries. Hence as democratisation progresses, a
growing share of the electorate should support open FDI policies since they beneﬁt from them.
Finally, thanks to the Internet, non-governmental organisations defending human rights have
been able to expand their international audience. Multinational companies are increasingly
likely to avoid investing in a repressive regime, to avoid damaging their brand name and image
(Spar, 1999). Empirically, Harms and Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2003), Busse (2004) and Jakob-
sen and De Soysa (2006) show that, since the beginning of the eighties, FDI has been directed
to developing countries which have granted political and civil freedom to their citizens.4
b) Provision of public goods
As La Porta et al. (1999) point out, governments play a large role in delivering health,
education and infrastructure, particularly when the consumption of these goods cannot be
conﬁned to certain individuals and generates large positive externalities.
A cheap labour force and a high-quality infrastructure are common determinants of FDI in
developing countries since their availability inﬂuences its feasibility and proﬁtability (UNCTAD,
1998; Mallampally and Sauvant, 1999). Chunlai (1997) and Lehmann (1999) emphasise that
4On the contrary, Li and Resnick (2003) ﬁnd that once property rights are controlled for, democracy exerts
a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on FDI. However, Jakobsen and De Soysa (2006) demonstrate that their results
are the product of sample selection and model mispeciﬁcation. Once they have added 46 countries to the sample
and taken the logarithm of FDI ﬂows, they ﬁnd a robust positive eﬀect of democracy on FDI.
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the best measure of labour costs is unit labour costs, i.e. labour compensation divided by labour
productivity. In line with the hypothesis that multinationals take advantage of international
diﬀerences in factor prices, they ﬁnd that FDI is more attracted by developing countries oﬀering
low unit labour costs. As health and education enhance a worker's productivity, and therefore
lower the unit labour cost, a positive link is likely to occur between multinational location and
human capital (Alsan et al., 2006). The setting-up of a foreign plant may also require a certain
amount of skilled labour (Markusen, 2002).
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Noorbakhsh et al. (2001), Asiedu (2002), Carr et al. (2004),
Alsan et al. (2006) and Asiedu (2006) verify that the availability of physical infrastructure and
the level of human capital (health and education) are important determinants of FDI.
c) Macroeconomic policies
The goals of macroeconomic policies are to maintain both the internal and the external
balance of the macroeconomic system (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2001). Internal equilibrium
refers to the full use of factors of production and to price stability. External equilibrium implies
that the trade balance is high enough to allow the country to pay back its foreign debts.
Sound macroeconomic policies are important determinants of FDI since rampant inﬂation,
a volatile/overvalued exchange rate and high external debt increase the cost of doing business
in developing countries and create uncertainty over future returns (Ahn et al., 1998; Balasub-
ramanyam, 2001). For instance, a high foreign debt to GDP ratio makes a country highly
vulnerable to external shocks and creates uncertainty for investors by increasing the possi-
bility of a debt overhang problem. In turn this may result in the levying of new taxes on
corporations or the imposition of capital controls (Pattillo et al., 2004).When considering trade
policies, it is important to emphasise that their impact depends on the type of FDI. Vertical
and export-platform FDI, which involve international trade of intermediate and ﬁnal goods,
should be concentrated in relatively open countries. On the other hand, horizontal FDI tends
to arise when trade costs (tariﬀ and transport costs) are high and/or when domestic proﬁts are
abnormally larger due to a lower exposure of domestic ﬁrms to international competition.
Numerous studies have established that FDI prefers macroeconomically stable countries.
Schneider and Frey (1985) and Ahn et al. (1998) ﬁnd a negative relationship between FDI
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and inﬂation or an overvalued currency. Other works, such as Bénassy-Quére et al. (2001) or
Aizenman and Marion (2004), bring to light the importance of a stable nominal/real exchange
rate. Finally, Singh and Jun (1995), Gastanaga et al. (1998) Lehmann (1999) and Asiedu
(2002) show through various trade indicators that multinational enterprises (MNEs) favour
open economies, suggesting that the bulk of FDI in developing countries may be export-oriented
rather than market-seeking.
d) Security of property rights and contracts
North (1990) deﬁnes property rights as the rights individuals appropriate over their own
labour and the goods and services they possess. Appropriation is a function of legal rules, or-
ganisational forms, enforcement, and norms of behaviour that is, the institutional framework 
(p.33). The creation, protection and enforcement of property rights and contracts are partic-
ularly important because without them the scope for market transactions is limited (World
Bank, 2002). North (1990), and more recently Clague et al. (1999), emphasise the crucial role
of the State as a third-party which secures property rights and enforces contracts, since this
function cannot usually be devolved to the market. In order to carry out this task, the State
makes use of the judiciary system and its monopoly of legitimate violence. Obviously, this
power to maintain peace also allows a predatory government to expropriate private agents, i.e.
to conﬁscate their property rights, if it so desires (North and Weingast, 1989).
Foreign investors demand the protection of their property and contract rights, especially
when their ownership advantage is technological; otherwise they are denied the return on their
investment and without this proﬁt incentive, they will not be inclined to take risk and invest in
the potential host country (Maskus, 1998; Li and Resnick, 2003). Overall, the higher transaction
and transformation costs induced by low security of property rights and contracts reduce the
proﬁtability and feasibility of economic activity (North, 1990).
Using qualitative measures of political instability, bureaucratic corruption or judicial ineﬃ-
ciency, many studies, such as Singh and Jun (1995), Lehmann (1999), Globerman and Shapiro
(2002, 2003) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) put forward that FDI is attracted to countries in
which there is a strong rule of law.
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2 Econometric model
This literature review suggests that, with the exception of market size, most of the determi-
nants of FDI can be gathered roughly under the heading of one of the four public governance
dimensions outlined above. In order to investigate the determinants of FDI into developing
countries, the following ﬁxed eﬀects model will be tested:
Ln (FDI)ti = β1Negative FDIt−1i + β2Ln (Market size)
t−1
i
+ β3Ln (Degree of democracy)t−1i + β4Ln (Public goods provision)
t−1
i
+ β5Ln (Macroeconomic policies)t−1i + β6Ln (Security of property rights)
t−1
i
+ T t + Ci + ²
t
i (1)
where T t are country-invariant time-speciﬁc t ﬁxed eﬀects, Ci are time-invariant country-
speciﬁc i ﬁxed eﬀects, and ²ti is the error term. Each explanatory variable is lagged by one
year to reduce any endogeneity bias and to take into account the fact that foreign investors
base their location choices on past information.5 When applicable, variables are measured in
logarithmic values. This has two advantages: such transformation reduces the inﬂuence of large
values and coeﬃcients can be directly interpreted as elasticities.
FDI: Data on net FDI inﬂows come from the UNCTAD/FDI database.6 Although FDI ﬂows
are a poor proxy of MNE's real activity (Lipsey, 2001), they are the only measure available for
all countries over a long time period. This explains why they have been used in most studies of
FDI. Current USD values are converted into constant 2000 USD, by multiplying current FDI
inﬂows by the ratio of constant price GDP to current price GDP. Since the logarithm of net FDI
inﬂows is taken, negative values of the dependent variable (8% of total observations) cannot be
5Changes in some public governance dimensions may take a long time to inﬂuence FDI, implying that the βs
may only capture the short-run elasticity and not the long-run elasticity. In that case, the βs would certainly
underestimate the full impact of public governance reforms. Estimations of ﬁnite distributed lag models of order
up to ﬁve (i.e. lagged values of independent variables are included in equation (1)), indicate that only in the case
of the dummy High civil rights can the equality between short- and long-run elasticities be rejected at the 5%
level; after ﬁve years, its impact is about twice as large as after one year. In addition, although the estimated
impact of the degree of democracy on FDI will be very conservative, the Bayesian Information Criterion (a
statistical criterion for model selection) indicates that the dynamics in model (1) are generally appropriate.
6http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1923&lang=1
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exploited.7
NEGATIVE FDI: The occurrence of past negative net FDI inﬂows may send a strong neg-
ative signal about operating conditions and economic prospects to potential foreign investors,
especially in the limited information context characterising developing countries (Kinoshita and
Mody, 2001). A negative FDI dummy is therefore included in the model among other determi-
nants of FDI. It takes the value of 1 if a country has experienced negative net FDI inﬂows the
previous year.8
MARKET SIZE: In empirical studies of FDI determinants, it is common to normalise FDI
ﬂows by GDP. Such a transformation is intuitive, as larger markets should, ceteris paribus,
receive more FDI,9 but rather restrictive since it implies that the elasticity of FDI to GDP
(coeﬃcient β2) is equal to unity. By not imposing any constraint on β2, the model adopted in
this paper is much more ﬂexible. Data on GDP, expressed in constant 2000 USD, come from
the 2005 World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2005).10
Good public governance is expected to be a key determinant of FDI. Such a multi-faceted
concept requires the use of numerous variables to assess the quality of the diﬀerent dimensions
of public governance:
(a) Degree of democracy
The democratic nature of the political regime is captured through six dummies.11
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY: Two dummies measure the extent to which political partic-
ipation is fully competitive and executives are elected. They are based on the Polity variable,
which is computed by subtracting an autocracy score from a democracy score (Marshall and
7There are no zero values in our sample.
8In dynamic panel data models, the lagged dependent variable needs to be instrumented since it is correlated
with the time-invariant country-speciﬁc eﬀect. In this paper, worries about a potential endogeneity of the lagged
negative FDI dummy may arise if it is assumed that country ﬁxed eﬀects are determinants of both negative
and positive FDI. However a probit regression indicates that the probability of negative FDI values is totally
unexplained by country ﬁxed eﬀects.
9As Chakrabarti (2001)'s literature review makes clear, GDP is the only determinant of FDI which is always
signiﬁcant, whichever the sample, time period and model used.
10As the within variation of GDP is highly correlated with the within variation of GDP per capita, the latter
cannot be included in model (1).
11Dummies are used in preference to continuous variables for three reasons. First, their use reduces multi-
collinearity among democratic proxies. Second, they allow the possibility of a non-linear eﬀect of democracy on
FDI. Finally, they facilitate the computation of the impact of diﬀerent political regimes on FDI.
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Jaggers, 2002). Both these scores are a sum of four components: competitiveness of executive
recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on the chief executive and competi-
tiveness/regulation of political participation. After having subtracted the points given for the
constraints on chief executive, the variable is rescaled from 1 to 7 (worst to best). The medium
(full) electoral democracy dummy takes the value of 1 if the transformed Polity variable is equal
to 3, 4 or 5 (6, 7 ) and 0 otherwise.
CIVIL RIGHTS: Two dummies indicate how much civil freedom is enjoyed by the citizens.
They are derived from the Freedom House indicator, which assesses four aspects of civil liberties
on a 1 to 7 global scale (best to worst): freedom of expression and belief, associational and
organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House,
2005). The medium (full) civil freedom dummy takes the value 1 if the Freedom House civil
rights indicator is equal to 3, 4 or 5 (1, 2 ).
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS: Two dummies measure the extent of constraints on policy
change, thanks to an index devised by Henisz (2000, 2002). The POLCONIII index estimates
the feasibility of policy change by taking into account the number of independent political
institutions with veto power (executive, upper house of legislature, lower house of legislature)
and the alignment and heterogeneity of the political actors who inhabit those institutions. The
variable is rescaled from 1 to 7 (worst to best). The medium (full) political constraints dummy
takes the value of one if the POLCONIII index is equal to 3, 4 or 5 (6, 7 ).
(b) Provision of public goods
HEALTH: Following Alsan et al. (2006), the health of the population is proxied by life
expectancy at birth, deﬁned as the number of years a new-born infant would live if prevailing
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. As
a measure of mortality, life expectancy is an imperfect measure of population health since it
does not directly take into account morbidity, i.e. years lived in less than full health. However,
based on World Health Organization (2002)'s data, a cross-country correlation between life
expectancy and its health-adjusted variant for the year 2001 reveals that these two measures
are almost perfectly correlated (0.99). Hence life expectancy at birth appears to be a suitable
proxy of a country's population health. Data come from the World Bank (WDI 2005).
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EDUCATION: Education of the population corresponds to the average years of schooling
in the total population over age 15. Values are the average of those in the Barro-Lee (Barro
and Lee, 2000) and Cohen-Soto (Cohen and Soto, 2007) datasets. Their spatio-temporal cov-
erage diﬀers slightly, expanding the information available on educational attainment across the
world, and when both series are available, taking the average may reduce measurement error
(Ndulu and O'Connell, 2003). Since data on life expectancy and educational attainment are
not available for consecutive years, missing values have been ﬁlled by linear interpolation.
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: As in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Gun-
ning (1999), the availability of physical infrastructure is assumed to be positively correlated
with the per-capita stock of ﬁxed telephone mainlines. Data come from Canning (1998) and
the World Bank (WDI 2005).
(c) Macroeconomic policies
INFLATION: As noted by Fischer (1993), the level of inﬂation is a good indicator of the
government's ability to manage the economy. Data on changes in price levels come from the
IMF World Economic Outlook Database.12
FOREIGN DEBT: On the external side, a high foreign debt to GNP ratio is another sign
of macroeconomic mismanagement (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Data on external debt stock
can be found in Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2006)'s database and GNP data come from World
Bank (WDI 2005).
OPEN TRADE POLICIES: Based on Wei (2000)'s methodology, a trade policy indicator
is constructed. It is the residual of the log-log regression of the standard trade openness ratio
(X+M
GDP
) on a time trend and structural determinants of a country's natural openness: population,
landlockedness and remoteness from world markets. Once these factors have been taken into
account, it is assumed that any deviation from predicted values is the consequence of trade
policies, which inﬂuence the degree of artiﬁcial openness. The indicator ranges between 1 and
10 (worst to best), according to the distribution decile in which the original residual value lies.
Data on population size and landlocked status come from the World Bank (WDI 2005). The
remoteness variable measures how geographically distant a given country is from world demand;
12http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/data/index.htm
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it is calculated according to Wagner et al. (2002)'s formula: Remi = 1Σf [(GDPf/GDPw)/Distanceif ]
and when i = f , the country's internal distance corresponds to (Areai
pi
)0.5.
(d) Security of property rights and contracts
PROPERTY RIGHTS: The strength of the rule of law is assessed through the ICRG Law
and Order index. It measures, on a 1-6 scale, both the strength and impartiality of the judicial
system and popular observance of the law. Data are accessible on the Political Risk Services '
website.13
TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS: The security of property rights and contracts may be threat-
ened by territorial armed conﬂicts. Based on the armed conﬂicts dataset developed by Uppsala
University (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004), three dummies are created, according to the in-
tensity and length of the conﬂict: (1) minor armed conﬂict, i.e. at least 25 battle-related
deaths per year and fewer than 1000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conﬂict; (2)
intermediate armed conﬂict, i.e. at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and at least 1000
battle-related deaths during the course of the conﬂict; (3) war, i.e at least 1000 battle-related
deaths per year.
T-1 time dummies and n-1 country dummies are also included.
FIXED EFFECTS: Time dummies control for unobserved time-speciﬁc factors common to
all countries. Country dummies control for country-speciﬁc factors which do not vary much over
the period observed and which cannot easily be proxied. For instance, a large proportion of FDI
in SSA countries is attracted by ﬁxed natural endowments, e.g. hydrocarbons and minerals.14
For various reasons, resource-abundant countries tend to have high risks of violent conﬂict
and poor governance (Bannon and Collier, 2003). Not taking into account the availability
of natural resources, or using the imperfect proxy commonly found in the literature (Stijns,
2006), i.e. the share of primary exports in total exports or gross national product, could result
in an omitted-variable bias, which is likely to generate an under-estimation of the impact of
public governance indicators. In this paper, the eﬀect of the availability of natural resources
13www.icrgonline.com
14It is estimated that the overall share of the primary sector in the total SSA stock of FDI in 1997 was 50%,
although it varies considerably at a disaggregated origin country level (UNCTAD, 1999, 2002).
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on FDI is thus captured by the inclusion of country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.15 In addition, a
particularly attractive feature of a ﬁxed eﬀects panel model, in comparison to a random eﬀects
panel model, is that it eliminates inter-country (between) variation. Assuming that natural
endowments are ﬁxed implies that this major source of heterogeneity between SSA and other
developing countries is removed since it cannot inﬂuence time-varying changes in FDI ﬂows
received. In this way, FDI attracted by natural resources is disentangled, to a certain extent,
from manufacturing or services FDI, the latter being, almost by deﬁnition, much more likely to
be sensitive to changes in public governance quality (Asiedu, 2002).16 Overall, by focusing on
short-run FDI dynamics, as the estimates solely indicate how FDI responds to changes within
a country over time, model (1) tests which public governance reforms are likely to exert the
strongest impact on the level of FDI received by a typical developing country, regardless of its
history and geography. Finally, a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel model also controls for country-speciﬁc
idiosyncrasies in FDI reporting, some countries omitting for instance to include reinvested
earnings in their FDI ﬁgures (IMF, 2003).
Data are available for 70 developing countries over the 1985-2004 period and include 28 SSA
countries, 22 LAC countries, 6 SEA countries and 14 other countries (Tables 1 and 2). The
country sample appears to be representative at the regional level since mean comparison tests
show that the means of most variables hardly alter when all the observations available for each
variable are considered, without being restricted by missing values of other variables.17
15For reasons given previously, treating the country-speciﬁc eﬀect as a random variable would not be ap-
propriate since natural resource availability, included in the error term, is likely to be correlated with other
explanatory variables.
16Unfortunately, disaggregated FDI data by sector does not exist for most countries.
17For example, over the period investigated, the average life expectancy is 49 years for the 28 SSA countries
in the sample and 49.5 years for an unrestricted sample of 45 SSA countries.
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Table 1: Countries in the sample, by region
SSA LAC SEA Other
Angola Argentina China Algeria
Botswana Bolivia Indonesia Bahrain
Burkina Faso Brazil Korea. Republic of Bangladesh
Cameroon Chile Malaysia Egypt
Congo Colombia Philippines India
Congo. Democratic Republic of Costa Rica Thailand Iran. Islamic Republic of
Côte d' Ivoire Dominican Republic Jordan
Ethiopia Ecuador Morocco
Gabon El Salvador Pakistan
Gambia Guatemala Papua New Guinea
Ghana Guyana Sri Lanka
Guinea Haiti Syrian Arab Republic
Kenya Honduras Tunisia
Madagascar Jamaica Turkey
Malawi Mexico
Mali Nicaragua
Mozambique Panama
Niger Paraguay
Nigeria Peru
Senegal Trinidad and Tobago
Sierra Leone Uruguay
South Africa Venezuela
Sudan
Tanzania, United Republic of
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Notes: SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa, SEA: South-East Asia, LAC: Latin America and Carribean.
Table 2: Summary table
SSA Non-SSA
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Net FDI inﬂows* 17.64 1.82 19.84 1.92
Negative FDI 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.17
Market size* 22.13 1.13 24.12 1.63
Medium political constraints 0.36 0.48 0.61 0.49
High political constraints 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.36
Medium civil rights 0.68 0.47 0.70 0.46
High civil rights 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.39
Medium political rights 0.36 0.48 0.13 0.33
High political rights 0.26 0.44 0.68 0.47
Health* 3.89 0.13 4.21 0.09
Education* 0.94 0.69 1.72 0.35
Physical infrastructure* 1.68 0.97 3.87 1.17
Inﬂation* 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.46
Foreign debt/GNP* 4.55 0.60 4.11 0.81
Trade policies* 1.64 0.57 1.60 0.64
Property rights* 1.34 0.27 1.36 0.34
Low-intensity territorial conﬂict 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
Medium-intensity territorial conﬂict 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.34
High-intensity territorial conﬂict 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28
Notes: *: variable expressed in logarithms. Std. Dev.: standard deviation.
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3 Results
Results are given in Table 3.18 Most of the explanatory variables have the expected sign and
are highly signiﬁcant. Broadly speaking, we ﬁnd that FDI tends to be attracted by large and
well-governed developing countries. More speciﬁcally, government accountability, human capi-
tal accumulation, the quality of macroeconomic policies and the security of property rights and
contracts are key determinants of FDI. However external debt, physical infrastructure, low-
intensity territorial conﬂict, medium political constraints and the degree of political rights do
not appear to matter. Foreign investors may not necessarily interpret an increase in external
indebtedness as a sign of macroeconomic deterioration: on the contrary, it may underline the
country's international creditworthiness19 or may be seen as a necessary prerequisite to the
ﬁnancing of growth-enhancing productive domestic investment. The stock of physical infras-
tructure may not vary enough over time to exert an impact on foreign investors. As indicated
by the growing magnitude and signiﬁcance of the territorial conﬂict dummies, ﬁghting only
aﬀects FDI if the conﬂict exceeds a certain intensity and duration. Finally, the mere existence
of political rights does not appear to guarantee the eﬀective accountability of a government; in
the absence of civil freedom and strong political constraints on executive discretion, the impact
of an illiberal/incomplete democracy is insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, a liberal democratic
country is found to attract about twice as much FDI as an autocratic one,20 although foreign
investors seem to be indiﬀerent to the degree of civil freedom once a certain threshold has been
reached. Overall these results are in line with Globerman and Shapiro (2002, 2003), Alsan et al.
18Several regression diagnostics were carried out. An omitted variable test, known as the linktest, indicates
that the model is well speciﬁed in the sense that no other regressors need to be included. Multicollinearity among
the variables does not appear to be an issue. Inﬂuential observations, both in terms of leverage and outlierness,
have been removed according to the Cook's distance statistic, which is a measure of the distance between the
coeﬃcient estimates when observation i is included and when it is not. Observations are conventionally char-
acterised as outliers when the Cook's distance measure exceeds 4n , where n is the total number of observations.
Using Wooldridge (1995)'s methodology for panel data models, sample selection bias does not appear to be
an issue. Finally, an Arellano and Bond (1991) test and a Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (Breusch and
Pagan, 1979) indicate that residuals are respectively autocorrelated up to order 3 and are heteroscedastic. On
the basis of Newey and West (1987)'s methodology, standard errors are corrected in order to be robust to both
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
19This hypothesis is supported by an unreported regression in which the debt stock is disaggregated into two
components: non-concessional debt and concessional debt. Both are signiﬁcant but with positive and negative
signs, respectively. Hence, foreign investors are likely to see increased ﬁnancing at market rates as indicating an
improvement in creditworthiness, and increased ﬁnancing by oﬃcial lenders at below market rates as signalling
the low solvency of a country. Inter-regional diﬀerences in the level and type of external debt explain on average,
5% of SSA FDI deﬁcit. Results are available upon request to the authors.
20[(exp0.237−1) + (exp0.562−1)] ∗ 100 ' 102%.
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(2006) and Asiedu (2006), which focus only on FDI in SSA countries. However, the magnitude
of these eﬀects must be treated with caution. First, the reliability of data from developing
countries is questionable and if there are measurement errors, the estimators will be biased and
inconsistent meaning that the estimated eﬀects of some determinants will be certainly attenu-
ated (Wooldridge, 2002).21 In addition, the coeﬃcients obtained only indicate the direct eﬀects
of each determinant on FDI, without taking into account interdependencies between the four
public governance dimensions. For instance, various papers have shown that democracies tend
to provide more public goods, in terms of health and education (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001;
Pinto and Timmons, 2005; Stasavage, 2005), but the transition from an authoritarian regime to
a competitive political system may increase civil disorder and delay the implementation of un-
popular macroeconomic policy reform (Fosu et al., 2006). Likewise, territorial conﬂicts destroy
physical infrastructure, including roads, schools and health facilities, and civil wars contribute
to the long-term deterioration of public governance (Collier et al., 2003). Hence, as in all FDI
studies, the total and true eﬀects of some determinants of FDI are likely to be underestimated
in Table 3.
The size and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients β̂ are suggestive of the policies that a developing
country needs to undertake to attract more FDI. However, they do not indicate which public
governance dimension contributes the most to diﬀerences in FDI attractiveness across devel-
oping regions. For instance, all developing countries would beneﬁt from lower inﬂation, but
this factor may not explain inter-regional diﬀerences if the level of inﬂation remains reasonably
constant across regions. Thus, in order to understand why SSA tends to attract relatively less
FDI than other regions, it is necessary to decompose the sources of SSA's FDI gap with other
developing regions.
Following Fernàndez-Arias and Montiel (2001) inter-regional diﬀerences in FDI volume can
21Correction of measurement errors using Fuller (1987)'s method of moments estimator indicates that equality
between the OLS estimates and errors-in-variables estimates cannot be rejected as long as the macroeconomic
and social indicators are on average at least 80% reliable, with reliability deﬁned as (1 - [variance of measurement
error/total variance])*100).
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Table 3: Determinants of foreign direct investment in developing countries and their relative
contribution to inter-regional diﬀerences in FDI volume
Fixed
eﬀects es-
timation
Relative contribution of each
determinant to inter-regional diﬀerences
in FDI volume (%)
Net
FDI
inﬂows
SSA vs
ALL
SSA vs
SEA
SSA vs
LAC
Determinants (1) (2) (3) (4)
Negative FDI -0.463a 2 2 2
(0.129)
Market size 0.699b 65 63 62
(0.306)
DEGREE OF DEMOCRACY 4 1 5
Medium political constraints 0.103 1 0 2
(0.093)
High political constraints 0.237b 1 1 1
(0.119)
Medium civil rights 0.564a 2 1 1
(0.117)
High civil rights 0.562a 3 1 6
(0.152)
Medium political rights 0.111 -1 -1 -1
(0.121)
High political rights -0.139 -2 -1 -4
(0.155)
PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION 46 36 52
Health 1.868a 24 17 26
(0.716)
Education 0.882b 23 20 27
(0.419)
Physical infrastructure -0.011 -1 -1 -1
(0.109)
Table continued on next page...
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Fixed
eﬀects es-
timation
Relative contribution of each
determinant to inter-regional diﬀerences
in FDI volume (%)
Net
FDI
inﬂows
SSA vs
ALL
SSA vs
SEA
SSA vs
LAC
Determinants (1) (2) (3) (4)
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 1 16 -11
Inﬂation -0.414a 0 7 -7
(0.081)
Foreign debt/GNP 0.043 0 -1 0
(0.101)
Open trade policies 0.715a 1 10 -4
(0.098)
SECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 0 2 1
Property rights 0.358b 1 2 0
(0.147)
Low-intensity territorial conﬂict 0.108 0 0 0
(0.115)
Medium-intensity territorial conﬂict -0.295b -1 -1 0
(0.116)
High-intensity territorial conﬂict -0.453a 0 1 1
(0.159)
STRUCTURAL FACTORS -18 -12 -7
TRANSITORY FACTORS 0 -8 -4
Constant -11.427
(7.472)
Observations 1109 - - -
R2 0.89 - - -
Notes: a, b, c denotes signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Unreported country and time dummies are included. Country and time dummies are jointly signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. ALL: all non-SSA countries.
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be expressed as:
Ln( ¯FDIj)− Ln ¯FDISSA)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = β̂[Ln(X¯j)− Ln(X¯SSA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸+ [(C¯j)− (C¯SSA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸+ [²j − ²SSA]︸ ︷︷ ︸ (2)
Actual diﬀerence Time-varying diﬀerence Structural diﬀerence Unexplained diﬀerence
where β̂ is the vector of the coeﬃcient estimates (Table 3, column 1), X are the time-varying
FDI determinants and C are the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The term on the left-hand-side
of equation (2) is the average diﬀerence in volume of FDI received by region j and the SSA
region over the period 1985-2004; the j region corresponds alternately to all non-SSA developing
countries, SEA and LAC. On the right-hand-side of the equation, the ﬁrst two terms capture
the explained portion of the diﬀerences in FDI attractiveness, i.e. they measure the extent to
which diﬀerences in market size, public governance quality and structural factors explain inter-
regional diﬀerences in FDI performance. The last term corresponds to diﬀerences in aggregate
FDI residuals and indicates whether the performance of the benchmark region has been higher
or lower than expected, based on international experience. Note that time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
disappear since they are common to all countries and regions.
The contribution of diﬀerences in time-varying, structural, and transitory factors to the FDI
gap between two regions can be calculated as follows:
Ln( ¯FDIj)− Ln ¯FDISSA)
Ln( ¯FDIj)− Ln( ¯FDISSA) =
β̂[Ln(X¯j)− Ln(X¯SSA)]
Ln( ¯FDIj)− (Ln( ¯FDISSA) +
(C¯j)− (C¯SSA)
Ln( ¯FDIj)− Ln( ¯FDISSA)
+
²j − ²SSA
Ln( ¯FDIj)− Ln( ¯FDISSA) (3)
The decomposition is based on simple average values of variables and shows the relative
contribution of each determinant to inter-regional diﬀerences in the FDI attractiveness of a
typical (average) country.22 Results of this decomposition are given in columns (2)-(4) of Table
3.
Two-thirds of the inter-regional FDI gaps can be accounted for by diﬀerences in market size.
22Decomposition using GDP-weighted average values of variables, indicating the relative importance of each
determinant in explaining inter-regional aggregate FDI gaps, gives similar results: low human capital accumu-
lation (health and education) in SSA explains 80-110% of inter-regional normalised FDI gaps. Results are
available upon request to the authors.
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Such a result not only emphasises the importance of local demand as a key determinant of FDI
but also highlights that countries in SSA are characterised by small and slow growing markets
in comparison to other developing regions. However, it makes little sense to contrast the FDI
performance of diﬀerent geographic zones without ﬁrst taking into account that economically
larger countries tend naturally to attract greater FDI ﬂows, in absolute terms, than smaller
countries (UNCTAD, 2002). In addition, from a per capita income growth perspective, it is
the foreign investment rate which matters, not the absolute size of inﬂows (see for instance
Borensztein et al. (1998)). Hence, most FDI studies use the ratio of FDI to GDP to compare
FDI performance across countries. This normalisation is valid as long as the elasticity of FDI
with respect to GDP equals unity, implying that FDI is not, for instance, income elastic thanks
to plant-level scale economies (Markusen, 1998; Carr et al., 2001). Although in this paper, the
FDI to GDP elasticity is estimated to be lower than one, the restriction that the coeﬃcient
β̂2 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity cannot be rejected: normalising FDI ﬂows by total
GDP would have been a data admissible model. A corollary implication of this unitary income
elasticity is that growth without improvement in public governance, resulting for instance from
windfall oil revenues, will not lead to a higher FDI to GDP ratio as both the numerator and the
denominator will grow at the same rate.23 Only improvements in public governance will raise
the FDI to GDP ratio sustainably. The rest of the paper discusses which dimensions of public
governance explain the inter-regional diﬀerences in normalised FDI performance between SSA
and the other developing regions.
Once inter-regional diﬀerences in market size are taken into account, columns 2-4 highlight
that the underlying commonality in explaining the weaker FDI attractiveness of SSA is its
relative poor record in terms of public goods provision. Low human capital accumulation
(health and education) in SSA explains 100-140% of inter-regional normalised FDI gaps. On
the other hand, whereas SEA has the best macroeconomic policies, SSA fares much better
than LAC in this policy area. On average, SSA macroeconomic policies are on a par with
those of non-SSA countries. Diﬀerences in the security of property rights and in the degree
of democracy do not signiﬁcantly contribute to FDI inter-regional gaps. Diverging structural
factors play a non-negligible role. Their negative contribution can be interpreted as capturing
23From another perspective, a temporary slowdown of the economy should not aﬀect the FDI to GDP ratio
ceteris paribus; this ratchet eﬀect may explain why FDI ﬂows, normalised by GDP, have been found to be less
volatile than other capital ﬂows (Levchenko and Mauro, 2006).
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the positive impact on FDI of the superior natural resources' endowment of an average SSA
country, compared to an average non-SSA country. Unlike Asiedu (2002), our results also show
that SSA countries are not structurally less attractive than other countries. In fact, the reverse
may be true as their subsoil wealth is a constant factor of attractiveness; unsurprisingly the three
countries with the highest ﬁxed eﬀects values all possess huge oil reserves: Angola, Sudan and
Nigeria. Finally, it appears that the econometric model predicts net FDI inﬂows in developing
countries quite well since the contribution of transitory factors (unexplained diﬀerences) to FDI
inter-regional gaps is very small.
Overall, the decomposition of the sources of SSA's FDI gap with other developing regions
has singled out the low provision of public goods, in terms of health and education, as the
public governance dimension contributing the most to SSA's relative low FDI attractiveness,
whichever is the benchmark region. Diﬀerences in the degree of democracy, quality of macroe-
conomic policies and security of property rights matter much less. The elasticity of FDI to
these determinants is smaller and contrary to common wisdom (Goldsmith, 2000), the quality
of SSA governance in these areas is not much diﬀerent to that of other developing regions.
Such ﬁndings echo the conclusions of Collier and Gunning (1999) on the causes of slow SSA
growth. In the next section, the determinants of SSA's relatively poor population health are
investigated, and, by extension, we consider how infectious diseases hinder FDI in SSA.
4 Health and FDI
The FDI literature has, until recently, mostly ignored the positive impact of human capital
on FDI.24 In addition, human capital has traditionally been identiﬁed with education. For
instance, no recent research focusing on the determinants of FDI in SSA, e.g. Asiedu (2006) or
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006), mentions the health component of human capital. In contrast,
Table 3 indicates that, after market size, education and health are the factors that contribute
the most to SSA's FDI deﬁcit, with about an equal weight.25 Furthermore, Figure 1 shows
24Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) and Alsan et al. (2006) are probably the ﬁrst cross-sectional studies to respectively
highlight the positive eﬀects of education and health on FDI in developing countries.
25In terms of elasticities, raising life expectancy or education by one year substantially increases net FDI
inﬂows by 3% and 16%, respectively. The semi-elasticities are calculated by dividing the coeﬃcient reported in
Table 3 by the mean sample value, e.g. semi-elasticityHealth = ElasticityHealthHealth =
1.868
62 ' 3% where Health is the
mean sample value of life expectancy.
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that the contribution of health to the FDI gap between SSA and the non-SSA aggregate zone
has increased over time and now exceeds the contribution of education, which has remained
more or less constant in the last two decades.26 Given the sparse attention paid by the FDI
literature to population health, and the observation that inter-regional diﬀerences in the latter
increasingly matter when attempting to explain the relatively poor FDI performance of SSA,
this section focuses on the links between health and FDI, with special reference to the pivotal
role of infectious diseases in the context of SSA.
Figure 1: The growing contribution of health to SSA's FDI deﬁcit
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There are several explanations for a large eﬀect of health on FDI (Alsan et al., 2006). From
a factor cost perspective, poor health raises unit labour cost by both lowering workers' produc-
tivity and increasing employee compensation. Healthier workers are more productive (Strauss
and Thomas, 1998; U.S. Agency for International Development, 2001; Bloom et al., 2003). They
are physically more robust and mentally more agile than undernourished and disabled workers.
In societies where good health is widespread, healthy workers are less likely to be absent from
work, since they fall sick less often or need less time to take care of sick relatives. Conversely,
repeated illnesses or, worse, deaths of colleagues or family members, may trigger a drop in
26Since inter-regional diﬀerences in FDI have also been fairly stable, their temporal variations cannot explain
the higher contribution of health to SSA's FDI deﬁcit.
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staﬀ morale causing low productivity. Bloom et al. (2004) estimate that a one-year increase
in life expectancy increases overall labour productivity by 4%. Workforce health also exerts a
signiﬁcant impact on labour costs (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2001; Bloom
et al., 2003). Coverage of health care costs and payment of death beneﬁts by employers may
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the proﬁtability of ﬁrms if total expenditures rise as a consequence of an epi-
demic. The costs of recruiting and training new workers can be fairly high. This is particularly
so if skilled staﬀ, who are in limited supply in developing countries, need to be replaced. In
addition, foreign companies may be deterred by the prospect of a shrinking customer base, as a
growing share of household incomes are earmarked for health-related expenditures (U.S. Agency
for International Development, 2001; Bloom et al., 2006b). Finally, it is probable that foreign
investors avoid countries in which their expatriates, or their clients in the case of the tourism
industry, are likely to contract an infectious disease and die (Sachs and Malaney, 2002).27
Figure 1 shows that life expectancy in SSA has always been lower than in other developing
regions and has recently declined, explaining the large and growing contribution of inter-regional
diﬀerences in health to SSA's FDI gap.28 As Bloom and Sachs (1998) emphasise, poor health
conditions cannot be blamed only on bad government policies; region-speciﬁc characteristics,
and a general lack of domestic ﬁnancial resources should be taken into account. Unfortunately
for SSA, a combination of favourable climatic and ecological conditions fosters high prevalence
of deadly Falciparum malaria, which claims about 1.21 million lives each year, with the majority
of them being African children (Lopez et al., 2006). In addition to this chronic negative eﬀect
of malaria on health, the reversal of the secular positive trend in life expectancy in SSA can
largely be attributed to the spread of HIV, which for economic, social and cultural reasons
is widespread in this region (see World Bank (1997)). On average, in 2000, 9% of the adult
population of SSA were infected with HIV, compared to less than 1% in other developing regions
(World Health Organization, 2004). By weakening the immune system of infected individuals,
HIV not only kills its host but also favours the resurgence in SSA of certain infectious diseases,
such as tuberculosis (Jamison et al., 2006). Prevention, treatment and eradication of malaria,
27Sachs and Malaney (2002) report the following story about the foreign investment of the London-base mining
and metals company Billiton In a US$1.4 billion joint venture investment to build an aluminium smelter in
Mozambique, the largest foreign investment so far in that country, the company was faced with 7000 cases of
malaria in two years, and the death of 13 expatriate employees (p. 684).
28On the other hand, although no cross-regional convergence has occurred, educational attainment has steadily
increased in both regions.
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HIV and tuberculosis require ﬁnancial resources far exceeding those of SSA governments.29
Indirectly these viral and bacterial scourges of mankind which are particularly prevalent
in SSA exert a deeply negative impact on FDI through their direct negative impacts on life
expectancy. Business surveys conﬁrm that executives are concerned about the current and
future impacts of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis on their company (Bloom et al., 2003,
2006a,b). For instance, answers to the 2003/2004 GCR Executive Opinion Survey (Bloom
et al., 2003) indicate that more than one third of the ﬁrms surveyed in developing countries
claim that at least one of these diseases exert, or will exert in the near future, some negative
impact on their business. Firms operating in Africa are much more pessimistic, especially about
the impact of AIDS/HIV: for 60% of them, this disease poses a serious threat to their activities.
In order to estimate the indirect impacts of HIV, malaria and tuberculosis on FDI, the
direct eﬀects of these three infectious diseases on health are calculated using the estimates of
the following model:
Ln (Life expectancyi) = γ0 + γ1Ln (GDP per capita)i + γ2Undernourishment prevalencei
+ γ3Safe water accessi + γ4Educationi + γ5HIV prevalencei
+ γ6malaria riski + γ7tuberculosis incidencei + εi (4)
where εi is the error term. Life expectancy is expected to depend on PPP-adjusted in-
come per capita, education, the prevalence of undernourishment, access to an improved water
source, the prevalence of HIV in the adult population, the risk of living in a deadly malaria
zone and the incidence of tuberculosis. All these variables have been identiﬁed as strong de-
terminants of population health in developing countries (Fogel, 1994; Pritchett and Summers,
1996; Hamoudi and Sachs, 1999; Fuchs, 2004; Grossman, 2004; Cutler et al., 2006). A high
income supports the public and private per capita expenditures on goods and services which
contribute to better health: public health services, private health care, medicines and shelter.30
29The Global Fund (2006) estimates that only a ﬁfth of the $25 billion needed in 2007 to reach three
internationally-agreed health targets (reaching universal coverage for HIV/AIDS treatment by 2010 and sig-
niﬁcantly increasing coverage of prevention and care activities; halving tuberculosis mortality and prevalence
and beginning to reverse the incidence of tuberculosis by 2015; halving malaria morbidity and mortality by
2010), can be funded by developing countries.
30Once GDP per capita is included in equation (4), various measures of public health inputs (e.g. public health
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PPP-adjusted income is used since the purchasing power of $1 diﬀers widely across countries.
An adequate supply of calories should make an individual less vulnerable to sickness and, in the
case of childbearers, it should foster normal foetal development, which reduces the incidence
of factors aﬀecting mortality in adulthood. To take into account the nutritional status of the
population, the proportion of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy con-
sumption is used. Access to safe drinking water is also included in equation (4) as this plays
a signiﬁcant role in reducing the prevalence of diarrhoeal diseases, which are a major cause
of infant deaths in developing countries (World Health Organization, 2005). Data for these
three variables come from the World Bank (WDI 2005). Well-educated individuals are more
likely to adopt behaviours that improve their health and the well-being of their families. As
in section 2, education is measured by the average years of schooling in the total population
over age 15. As previously mentioned, the population of developing countries, especially of
SSA, is severely aﬀected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Data on HIV prevalence in
the adult population (the percentage of people aged 15-49 who are infected with HIV), come
from the World Bank (WDI 2005), while that on tuberculosis incidence (the yearly number of
new cases per thousand people), can be found on the WHO site.31 Finally, an index of deadly
malaria prevalence has been constructed by Gallup and Sachs (2001). This is calculated using
the fraction of the population in high malaria risk areas multiplied by the fraction of cases of
malaria that are Plasmodium Falciparum. Although the data are currently only available for
the year 1994, maps of malaria risk shows that malaria prevalence in tropical countries has been
fairly stable during the last ﬁfty years (Gallup and Sachs, 2001).
Data for most of these variables are only available for the period 2000-2004 and for 65
developing countries.32 Hence, their average values over this period are used in the econometric
estimation. The linktest indicates that no important determinant of health has been omitted.
Outliers were removed according to the Cook's distance statistic. Finally, the possibility of
reverse causality between health and income or education is taken into account by instrumenting
these two variables by their lagged values, averaged over the 1991-1994 and 1995-1999 periods.33
expenditures per capita and births attended per skilled health workers per capita), are no longer signiﬁcant.
31http://www.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/default.asp
32Unavailability of data and instrumentation of health and income preclude the use of a simultaneous equation
framework, in which equations (1) and (4) would be simultaneously estimated.
33Recent reviews of microeconomic and macroeconomic studies stress that health is a strong determinant of
worker productivity and economic growth (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Bloom et al., 2004). Likewise, health
inﬂuences education. Healthy children are less likely to miss school and beneﬁt from better cognitive develop-
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Results are presented in Table 4.
Column (5) shows that most explanatory variables are signiﬁcant at the 1% level and the
variance explained is extremely high with an R2 of 0.96. In column (6), GDP per capita
and education are instrumented by their lagged levels. The Sargan-Hansen test suggests that
the chosen instruments are valid, in the sense that they are not correlated with the error term.
Results obtained through instrumental variables regression are similar to those found previously,
indicating that GDP per capita and education are unlikely to be endogenous. A Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test conﬁrms the exogeneity of these two variables. At the sample mean, a 1% point
rise in HIV prevalence causes a drop in life expectancy of about 1.1 years and life expectancy
is 5.3 years lower in a country fully exposed to Falciparum malaria.34 These estimates are close
to those found by Bawah and Binka (2003) and UN DESA-Population Division (2006). On the
other hand, no link is found between tuberculosis incidence and life expectancy. An unreported
regression shows that the coeﬃcient of this variable loses its size and signiﬁcance once the HIV
prevalence rate is included in equation (4). This is not surprising since an immuno-compromised
person is very vulnerable to opportunistic infections such as tuberculosis. Hence, as long as the
prevalence of HIV is not taken into account, the incidence of tuberculosis is likely to act as a
proxy for the spread of the HIV disease in a country. However, once the deaths attributable to
HIV are isolated, the consequences of tuberculosis on life expectancy are very limited.
In order to pick out the factors which contribute most to the low life expectancy in SSA,
the relative contribution of each determinant to the health gap between SSA and non-SSA
is shown in column (7). In a similar fashion to equation (3), the decomposition is based on
simple average values of variables and shows the relative contribution of each determinant to
inter-regional diﬀerences in life expectancy:
Ln( ¯Healthnon−SSA)− Ln ¯HealthSSA)
Ln( ¯Healthnon−SSA)− Ln( ¯HealthSSA)
=
γ̂[Ln(X¯non−SSA)− Ln(X¯SSA)]
Ln( ¯Healthnon−SSA)− (Ln( ¯HealthSSA)
+
+
εnon−SSA − εSSA
Ln( ¯Healthnon−SSA)− Ln( ¯HealthSSA)
(5)
ment, while a longer life horizon makes investment in education more attractive (Scrimshaw, 1998; Bloom and
Canning, 2003).
34This implies that a developing country with a HIV prevalence rate of 5% experiences the same loss in life
expectancy than a country fully exposed to malaria.
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Table 4: The indirect impact of HIV and malaria on FDI
Estimation
Relative contribution of
each determinant to
inter-regional diﬀerence
in life expectancy (%)
Impact of
infectious
diseases on
FDI (%)OLS IV
Life expectancy SSA vs ALL β4 ∗ γ5−6
Determinants (5) (6) (7) (8)
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita 0.066a 0.066a 19
(0.017) (0.017)
Education 0.015a 0.014a 11
(0.004) (0.004)
Prevalence of undernourishment -0.001 -0.001 3
(0.001) (0.001)
Prevalence of HIV in adult population (%) -0.019a -0.019a 33
(0.002) (0.002)
Rise in HIV prevalence of 1% point -3.5
Deadly malaria risk -0.088a -0.088a 18
(0.022) (0.022)
Rise in pop. at risk of malaria of 1% point -0.16
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 103) -0.000 -0.000 2
(0.000) (0.000)
Safe water access 0.001c 0.001c 9
(0.001) (0.001)
Transitory factor 5
Constant 3.609a 3.608a
(0.120) (0.119)
Observations 65 65
R2 0.96 0.96
Instruments gdppct−1, gdppct−2, educationt−1, educationt−2
Sargan-Hansen overidentiﬁcation test P-value - 0.20
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test P-value - 0.96
Notes: a, b, c denotes signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ALL: all non-SSA
countries. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. IV: Instrumental Variables regression. The variable HIV prevalence is expressed in %.
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Slightly less than two-thirds of SSA's health deﬁcit can be attributed to infectious diseases
while the remaining one-third is explained by diﬀerences in wealth and, to a lesser extent, in
education and in access to safe water. Among infectious diseases, the direct contribution of
HIV to the relatively poor health of the SSA population largely exceeds that of malaria.35 This
result corroborates the ﬁndings of Neumayer (2004) which demonstrates that the recent cross-
national divergence in life expectancy mainly ﬁnds its roots in the rising spread of the HIV
disease.36
Indirectly, these infectious diseases exert a deeply negative and growing impact on FDI
through their direct eﬀects on health. On the basis of columns (1) and (5), the impact of
infectious diseases on FDI can be calculated as:
%∆FDI(col.8) ' 100 ∗ β4 (col.1) ∗ γ5−6 (col.5) ∗Disease prevalence (6)
where 100 ∗ (β4 ∗ γ5−6) is the semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to the prevalence of HIV
or malaria. Column (8) shows that a 1% point rise in HIV prevalence in the adult population
is associated with a decrease in net FDI inﬂows by 3.5%, whereas a country in which 100%
of the population is at risk of contracting deadly malaria receives about 16% less FDI than
a similar country located in a malaria-free region.37 Table 5 and Figure 2 illustrate the FDI
losses experienced by SSA countries as a consequence of their high disease environment. Using
equation (6), they display the percentage increase in yearly FDI that a SSA country would have
received during the 2000-2004 period if HIV and malaria had not existed. In this hypothetical
scenario, yearly net FDI inﬂows would have been about one-third higher in the median SSA
country, with roughly equal contributions of HIV and malaria.38 Hence, as suggested by Bloom
and Sachs (1998) and Sachs and Malaney (2002), the integration of SSA countries into the
world economy, and by extension, their economic growth, is greatly hindered by malaria and
the spread of the HIV/AIDS disease.
35Note that the overall contribution of both infectious diseases is likely to be higher since they have been
found to depress economic growth and educational achievement (Bonnel, 2000; Sachs and Malaney, 2002).
36After completing this paper, we became aware that UNAIDS had revised downward most of their HIV
prevalence estimates in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 5). Using these new data, obtained from UNAIDS senior
epidemiologist Karen Stanecki, leaves the results of Table 4 virtually unchanged.
37Respectively:1.868 ∗ −1.9 ' −3.5% and 1.868 ∗ −8.8 ' −16.4%.
38For transparency purpose, in addition to the data used in this paper, average and median FDI losses based
on the recently revised HIV prevalence estimates are also given. Our results remain fundamentally unchanged.
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Table 5: Prevalence of infectious diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa and FDI losses
Country Prevalence FDI losses (%) Share of the impact (%)
HIV (%) malaria (%) HIV malaria
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Angola 4 <4> 100 30 45 55
Benin 2 <2> 100 23 29 71
Botswana 38 <28> 36 138 96 4
Burkina Faso 3 <2> 100 27 39 61
Burundi 6 <3> 100 38 57 43
Cameroon 6 <6> 100 39 58 42
Chad 5 <3> 99 33 51 49
Central African Republic 13 <11> 100 64 74 26
Congo 5 <6> 100 34 52 48
Congo, Democratic Republic of 4 <3> 100 31 47 53
Côte d'Ivoire 7 <5> 100 40 59 41
Djibouti 3 <3> 100 26 38 62
Eritrea 3 <2> 76 22 43 57
Ethiopia 4 <2> 58 24 61 39
Gabon 8 <8> 100 43 62 38
Gambia 1 <2> 100 21 20 80
Ghana 3 <2> 100 26 36 64
Guinea 3 <2> 100 27 39 61
Kenya 7 <7> 84 40 65 35
Lesotho 29 <24> 0 102 100 0
Liberia 6 <3> 100 36 54 46
Madagascar 2 <0> 100 22 24 76
Malawi 14 <14> 100 66 75 25
Mali 2 <2> 99 23 29 71
Mauritania 1 <1> 85 16 12 88
Mozambique 12 <14> 100 59 72 28
Namibia 21 <17> 62 85 88 12
Niger 1 <1> 98 20 20 80
Nigeria 5 <4> 100 35 54 46
Rwanda 5 <4> 100 34 52 48
Senegal 1 <1> 100 19 15 85
South Africa 19 <18> 2 68 99 1
Sudan 2 <2> 98 23 31 69
Swaziland 39 <31> 10 136 99 1
Tanzania, United Republic of 8 <7> 100 45 64 36
Togo 4 <3> 100 31 47 53
Uganda 5 <7> 100 33 50 50
Zambia 16 <17> 100 73 78 22
Zimbabwe 25 <23> 62 97 90 10
Mean SSA 9 <8> 86 45 <41> 54 <51> 46 <49>
Median SSA 5 <4> 100 34 <30> 52 <46> 48 <54>
Mean non-SSA Less than 1 23
Median non-SSA Less than 1 4
Notes: HIV prevalence rates have been averaged over the 2000-2004 period and the fraction of the population at risk of
contracting deadly malaria has been assumed to have remained constant since 1994. <.> Revised UNAIDS estimates for
the period 2000-2004 (UNAIDS, 2006). FDI losses are the percentage increase in yearly net FDI ﬂows that a country
would have received during the 2000-2004 period if HIV and malaria had not existed. They are calculated according to
the following formula: (HIV prevalence)*(β4γ5) + (malaria prevalence/100)*(β4γ6), with β4γ5=3.5 and β4γ6=16.4.
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Figure 2: FDI losses due to infectious diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa
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5 Conclusion
The relatively poor FDI performance of Sub-Saharan Africa can largely be explained by insuf-
ﬁcient provision of public goods, in terms of health and education. Although the results in this
paper show that SSA countries are not structurally less attractive than non-SSA developing
countries sharing the same public governance outcomes, it ought to be remembered that these
outcomes can be driven as much by government policies as by geographical, societal reasons and
limited domestic ﬁnancial resources. For instance, region-speciﬁc conditions have fostered the
spread of malaria and HIV, two deadly infectious diseases responsible for more than half of the
contemporaneous diﬀerence in life expectancy between SSA and other developing regions. The
public-good nature and negative externalities of these infectious diseases (World Bank, 1997)
warrant government intervention but the limited national resources of SSA countries make it
unlikely that they will be able to cope with these two human scourges without the assistance
of the international community. Unfortunately, international resources committed to ﬁghting
malaria and HIV/AIDS in the last decade have been inadequate (Attaran and Sachs, 2001;
Sachs, 2005), and have ignored the fact that treating infectious diseases brings great beneﬁts to
developed countries (World Bank, 1997). Adopting concerted public health policies at both the
international and national levels would generate large economic and welfare pay-oﬀs, including,
as this paper shows, stronger economic integration of SSA into the world economy.
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